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Feminist and Trans Perspectives on Identity and the UK Gender Recognition 
Act 
 
Introduction 
 
Trans theory is emerging rapidly as an influential set of perspectives within gender and 
feminist studies; it is playing a major role in debates about not only sex/genderi  identity, but 
also key socio-political themes including rights, autonomy, power, oppression, inclusion and 
equality (e.g. Stryker and Aizura 2013; Stryker and Whittle 2006). Trans theory is thus 
contributing significantly to discussions about the central theoretical tenets and political goals 
of feminism, sometimes challenging long and deeply held beliefs about the purpose of 
feminist theory and activism (Bettcher 2014). This has generated a complex, dynamic and 
occasionally fraught relationship between feminists and trans theorists.ii Some thinkers 
highlight their shared interests and the importance of collaboration (e.g. Butler 2004; Califia 
1997; Cromwell 1999; Elliot 2010; Enke 2012; Heyes 2003; Koyama 2003; Overall 2012), 
whilst others argue that they are incompatible and that trans theory should have no place 
within feminism (e.g. Bindel 2004; Daly 1978; Greer 1999; Hausman 1995; Jeffreys 2003; 
2005; 2008; 2014a; Raymond 1994). Despite, or because of, these differences, it is clear that 
trans theory is contributing to the feminist agenda in a multitude of ways and thus feminists 
must engage – whether positively or negatively – with the issues and arguments being raised 
within trans studies. Outside of this burgeoning academic field trans identities are gaining 
increasing publicity within the media and hence being brought to the greater attention of the 
general public.iii There has also been a proliferation of documentaries, newspaper articles and 
online blogs about trans identities and issues, in addition to academic articles and books 
(Stryker 2013). 
 
It is in the light of these developments that Jeffreys (2008) offers a radical feminist analysis 
of the UK’s Gender Recognition Act (GRA), which grants individuals legal recognition of 
their desired sex/gender. She argues that the GRA is a problematical piece of legislation that 
should be retracted because it (i) reinforces stereotypical notions of gender and ultimately 
hinders the feminist goal of eradicating gender; and (ii) is undermined by instances of regret 
and reversion experienced by trans individuals. She develops these concerns into the wider 
assertion that trans theory and the existence of trans identities are inimical to the goals of 
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feminism. Jeffreys’s claims are echoed by a growing number of feminists who are critical of 
trans identities, in large part because of the latter’s perceived complicity with, even 
endorsement of, stereotypical conceptions of masculinity and femininity. Consequently, trans 
identities are accused of being antithetical to the feminist goal of eliminating gender. 
 
In this paper I argue that feminist criticisms of trans identities and the GRA are unconvincing. 
In response to Jeffreys I defend how sex and gender are understood within the GRA. I also 
show that the issues of regret and reversion amongst trans individuals do not pose a problem 
for the GRA. I then respond to the more general radical feminist critique of trans individuals, 
specifically that they are supportive of patriarchy and hence contrary to the goals of 
feminism. I begin by challenging the radical feminist goal of eradicating gender, arguing 
instead that we must attend to experiences of embodied gender in order to identify and 
understand oppression. Such attention highlights the value of the GRA for many trans 
individuals. I then show that trans individuals are often critical of traditional gender norms 
and reflective about the problems of patriarchy. Accordingly, contra radical feminist 
concerns, I suggest that feminism and trans theory can, and should, establish productive 
collaborations in order to better examine and respond to instances of gender oppression 
wherever and however they arise. This includes addressing the high levels of violence and 
oppression experienced by trans individuals, which the GRA can play an important role in 
combating. Thus, the paper addresses both the importance of the GRA itself and the wider, 
pressing themes of how best to conceptualise gender, its role within feminist politics and the 
relationship between feminism and trans theory. 
 
 
(I) Trans Individuals, Feminism and the UK’s Gender Recognition Act 
 
Any discussion of contemporary sex/gender identities is confronted immediately with the 
issue of definition. The terms “transsexual” and “transgender” are contested and multivalent, 
which makes their use potentially problematic. “Transgender” is often understood as an 
umbrella term that refers to people whose sex/gender identities deviate from – and hence 
challenge – the ways in which sex and gender are conventionally understood within society 
(Stryker 2008; NCTE 2014).iv The term “transsexual” is an older one that originated in 
medical and psychological communities, although a number of people continue to define 
themselves as transsexual. It is often used to denote individuals who identify unambiguously 
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as either male or female and, typically, seek to undergo a permanent change of sex.v I use 
“trans” as a general term incorporating the plethora of sex/gender identities, including 
transsexual identities, which challenge conventional notions embedded in the sex/gender 
system, whilst acknowledging that such a definition is contestable and can vary both across 
and within trans communities. It is not intended to deny or erase the important differences 
between trans identities. In line with Serano’s (2007) recommendation, I use the term “cis” to 
refer to individuals whose gender identity conforms to the sex that they were assigned at birth 
(i.e. people who are non-trans).vi 
 
Setting definitional caveats aside, the important point for present purposes is that a number of 
trans individuals experience a sense of gender identity that differs from what is typically 
associated with the sex they were assigned at birth. This can lead such individuals to choose 
to transition, a complex process through which they live as the sex/gender that they identify 
with. Transitioning can involve some or all of the following: changing one’s name, dressing 
and grooming differently, altering one’s behaviour, taking hormones, changing official 
identity documents and/or undergoing surgery. The UK’s GRA was introduced in 2004 and 
grants governmental recognition to trans individuals who want to transition from female to 
male or vice-versa. Whilst a number of other countries have GRAs,vii the UK’s legislation is 
radical insofar as it does not require that individuals have undergone sex reassignment 
surgery (SRS) in order to be recognised as their desired sex/gender.viii Rather, individuals 
who have not undergone SRS but nevertheless wish to alter their sex/gender status must (i) be 
diagnosed with “gender dysphoria”;ix (ii) live as their desired gender for at least two years; 
and (iii) intend to live with their acquired gender until death (UK Gender Recognition Act 
2004). 
 
The significance of the GRA derives not only from the implications that it has for the lives of 
trans individuals, but also the important, complex ethical and political questions that it raises 
about sex, gender and identity. The GRA provides a fulcrum for debates about the social 
accommodation of trans identities, human and legal rights, individual autonomy and social 
equality. These issues come to a head in arguments over, for example: the use of gendered 
public toilets and changing rooms by trans people (Jeffreys 2014b; Molotch and Norén 
2010); trans people’s participation in competitive sports (Coggon et al. 2008); the housing of 
trans individuals in prisons (Rosenblum 2000; Mann 2006); marriages involving trans people 
(Sharpe 2012); and trans individuals’ access to gendered spaces and organisations (Elliot 
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2010; Namaste 2011; Sweeny 2004). One major reason why these issues are so contentious is 
because society is deeply structured by a naturalised, binary notion of sex and gender, which 
is unsettled when individuals cross or blur this binary – something that the GRA makes 
possible.  
 
Despite the relevance of trans identities and the GRA to many important feminist debates and 
concerns, Sandland (2005, 44) observes that ‘feminists and other critical theorists of gender 
(and sexuality) have by and large tended to bracket transsexualism off as a minority issue 
with no particular wider resonances’. Jeffreys attempts to correct this lack of engagement by 
offering an analysis of the GRA from a radical feminist perspective. It is important to 
examine Jeffreys’s position because she has offered the clearest, most comprehensive and 
sustained feminist critique of trans identities and politics to date. She thus represents a 
growing movement against trans identities amongst radical feminists (Jeffreys 2014a, 2). Her 
analysis of the GRA represents a distilled account of her wider theoretical position (Jeffreys 
2003; 2005; 2014a) and thus provides a useful means to assess her overall arguments – and 
radical feminist arguments more generally – about trans identities. 
 
Jeffreys’s overarching contention is that ‘the GRA is a retrogressive legislation which 
inscribes traditional gender roles into law so that they can be identified and regulated by the 
state’ (Jeffreys 2008, 331). Consequently, the GRA should be removed from UK law as it 
hinders efforts to eradicate the oppression of women. Jeffreys’s stance is underpinned by her 
belief that gender is an essentially patriarchal concept that embodies ‘forms of behaviour 
which stem from and maintain unequal power relations between the sexes’, and thus needs to 
be ‘eliminated’ (Jeffreys 2008, 331). She concludes that trans identities are problematic 
because they are dependent upon, and constructed by, gender. This echoes arguments that 
Jeffreys (2003; 2005) has offered previously and connects with concerns raised by other 
radical feminists who criticise trans identities for embodying conservative and patriarchal 
conceptions of masculinity and femininity (e.g. Bindel 2004; Burchill 2001; Hausman 1995; 
Daly 1978; Raymond 1994). There are, then, two distinct but related arguments offered by 
Jeffreys. Her first concerns the legislation of the GRA itself; her second addresses trans 
identities and their status within feminist politics. I will deal with each in turn before 
considering the future of the GRA and the relationship between feminism and trans theory. 
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Jeffreys’s Analysis of the GRA 
 
Jeffreys’s major complaints against the GRA centre upon the way in which sex and gender 
were understood within government debates about the GRA Bill and the implications this has 
for issues of reversion and regret with regard to trans individuals (Jeffreys 2008, 332-6). She 
argues that the legislation ‘is mired in a profound confusion over the difference between sex 
and gender’ (Jeffreys 2008, 333). Specifically, the GRA does not distinguish adequately 
between sex and gender as two distinct phenomena. She quotes the following statement made 
by Lord Filkin, a major proponent of the GRA during its drafting, as being particularly 
problematic: 
 
The Bill is about legal recognition and it will define a person’s sex in law. We 
consider the arguments about the meaning of the words “sex” and “gender” to be 
beside the point. There is no stark dichotomy between the meaning of the words 
(quoted in Jeffreys 2008, 334). 
 
Jeffreys objects to this position, referring to it as ‘casuistry’ (Jeffreys 2008, 334). She insists 
that sex and gender should be kept distinct, with the former being grounded in biological 
facts about a person (Jeffreys 2014a, 5). Jeffreys is thus critical of Lord Filkin’s claim that the 
‘word “sex” now has more of a social and psychological connotation than it would have had 
20 or 30 or so years ago’ (quoted in Jeffreys 2008, 334). 
 
However, there are good reasons to endorse Lord Filkin’s refusal to distinguish sharply 
between sex and gender, as well as his claim that sex has a social dimension. A number of 
theorists have offered persuasive arguments against the idea that sex can be easily defined in 
terms of biological facts about the body without reference to cultural factors, thus 
undermining the idea that they are distinct (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994). 
For example, Fausto-Sterling (1993; 2005) demonstrates that cultural conditioning shapes 
many sex-specific traits assumed to be purely natural. Her work reveals how social practices 
shape biology so that we cannot speak of a natural body as it is in itself. Similarly, Fujimura’s 
research into genetic sex determination collapses the sex-gender distinction by showing that 
‘Sex, even at the genetic level, is a sociomaterial process and product’ (Fujimura 2006, 75) 
and hence the categories “male” and “female” are ‘already and always social categories’ 
(Fujimura 2006, 76). This reflects the experiences of many trans individuals, for whom 
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identity and the body intertwine in ways that undermine the distinction between physical sex 
and social gender (Shrock et al. 2005). 
 
Furthermore, what constitutes or counts as the essential aspect(s) of a person’s sex is also the 
product of social discourses and practices (Overall 2012, 254). This can be seen from both 
the historically and culturally variable ideas about what determines a person’s sex and also 
the ambiguity over what, specifically, makes someone a male or a female. Are external 
genitalia, internal reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, internal reproductive 
organs, or some combination of all of these, to be taken as the ultimate signifier(s) of sex? It 
is noteworthy that such concerns were expressed by Professor Robert Winston during the 
House of Lords 2nd sitting of the GRA Bill. He stated that: 
 
The definition of sex is extremely complicated… to define it simply as genital, 
hormonal or, as the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit [an opponent of the Bill], seeks to do, 
as gonadal, is a travesty of what really happens… I urge the House to be very 
cautious about defining it in terms of chromosomal, genital or any other simple 
definition. It simply is not medically just, and I am sure that it would produce bad 
law (Gender Recognition Bill, House of Lords Report Stage, Hansard 03/02/2004, 
cols. 619-620). 
 
Jeffreys also objects that the GRA is flawed because it uses the concept of gender to guide 
the legal alteration of a person’s sex. Thus, it allows a person’s acquired gender to determine 
what their sex will be, and so someone born with a body that is sexed as female can still 
legally become male, even if their body is not physically altered. This means that the very 
notion of “sex” is in danger of being disconnected from biology, because there will be people 
legally classified as “male” who do not have a penis, testicles or other signifiers of the male 
sex. As Lord Tebbit argued in opposition to the Bill, ‘Sex cannot be changed… Sex is 
decided by the chromosomes of a human being… there is no law nor any medical procedure 
that can change the sex of a human being. The Bill purports to do so. It is therefore an 
objectionable farce’ (Gender Recognition Bill, House of Lords Second Reading, 18/12/03, 
Hansard: Column 1304). Jeffreys (2008, 334) commends him for his stance. She refuses to 
use the terms MtF (male-to-female) and FtM (female-to-male) because ‘they give the 
mistaken impression that sex can be changed when, in fact, it cannot’ (Jeffreys 2014a, 8). 
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The belief that one’s sex at birth is determined by nature and fixed for life is a common one 
amongst critics of trans identities and the GRA (e.g. Bindel 2004; Burchill 2001; Greer 1999; 
Raymond 1994). As Bindel (2009) argues, ‘a trans-sexual “woman” will always be a 
biological male’. However, such a position has received substantial criticism from feminists 
and trans theorists (see Elliot 2010, 113-48; Shrage 2009). One problem is that we need to 
justify why the sex that one is assigned at birth should be the final determinant of one’s adult 
identity, especially when we acknowledge that many other aspects of our identity change 
over time. It merely begs the question to hold that only individuals born male or female can 
truly be men or women because what makes us men or women is our sex at birth. As Enke 
(2012, 1) notes, rather than being natural and present from birth ‘Gender, and also sex, are 
made through complex social and technical manipulations’. Accordingly, Overall (2009) has 
argued that sex/gender transitioning should be placed alongside other personal 
transformations through which we shape our identities. 
 
One response is to say that it is one’s experiences as being male or female that determines 
one’s sex/gender category, and transsexuals have not experienced being their desired 
sex/gender. However, it is not clear what experiences will count as being the true experiences 
of being a man – and invariably whatever experiences we choose will not be had by some 
people born and recognised as male. Aside from this problem of essentialising identity, there 
are many trans individuals who do live as their desired sex/gender prior to hormonal or 
surgical transitioning, which would provide them with the relevant experience (perhaps so 
long as they successfully pass). It again seems arbitrary to say that only those born as male or 
female can have the requisite experiences of being male or female, or that such experiences 
can only be had by people with certain biological features present from birth. In addition, 
many trans individuals really do feel that they are male or female, despite the physical bodies 
that they were born with, and it is hard to see why and how we can or should disregard this 
phenomenological evidence in favour of an unsubstantiated assertion that the body one is 
born with is / should be the final determinant of one’s later identity (Rubin 2003). In the light 
of these issues, there seems good reason to endorse the GRA’s move away from the beliefs 
that one’s sex is fixed at birth and that there is a neat dividing line between one’s biological 
sex and social gender. As Overall (2012, 255) observes, individuals who transition show that 
‘belonging to a sex is a social, not a biological, phenomenon; that one’s sex is not inevitably 
fixed and immutable; and that one’s genitalia (or any other body characteristics) do not 
inevitably represent, let alone determine through biological inevitability, who or what one is’. 
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Jeffreys’s attempt to sharply separate biologically-given sex from culturally-constructed 
gender leads her to conceive of a person’s desire to change their legal sex/gender as 
behaviour that is subject to choice and simply an alteration in lifestyle. She argues that the 
GRA misunderstands gender because it requires the applicant to stay in their chosen gender 
for life, which gives it an “essential” quality and sets ‘in aspic the change that it recognises’ 
(Jeffreys 2008, 335). Her concern is that ‘Behaviours which are subject to choice and not 
biology cannot be dictated in this way’ (Jeffreys 2008, 335). There is good reason to agree 
with Jeffreys’s complaint about the GRA’s stipulation of permanency, because it implies a 
picture of the self as fixed and stable. This overlooks the self’s more fluid and unpredictable 
nature (McQueen 2015a). However, Jeffrey’s attempt to reduce gender to a “lifestyle choice” 
is problematic because it misrepresents the embodied realities of trans individuals. What is 
striking about many trans self-narratives – and, indeed, the self-experiences of cis individuals 
too – is that their sense and experiences of gender are precisely not a matter choice but rather 
something that they experience as an ingrained, immutable and essential aspect of their self 
(e.g. Davy 2011; Hines 2007; Mason-Schrock 1996; Rubin 2003; Tauchert 2002). Crucially, 
Jeffreys does not distinguish between gender as it is socially recognised and gender as it is 
lived at the level of embodied existence. Whilst the former is subject to some degree of 
choice on the agent, the latter is not. The GRA provides individuals with the choice of how 
their sex/gender is recognised, given their sense of sex/gender identity. The GRA thus aims at 
responding to a pressing problem – that of gender dysphoria and the difficulties that trans 
individuals experience – rather than resolving seemingly intractable debates about the causes 
of gender dysphoria or what really makes someone a man, woman or both/neither. 
 
Jeffreys’s final argument against the GRA follows on from her discussion of gender as a 
lifestyle choice. She claims that the GRA is undermined by individuals who transition but 
later regret their decision and/or revert back to their previous sex/gender. Such individuals 
pose problems for the GRA’s requirement that applicants intend to spend the rest of their life 
in their chosen sex/gender. More fundamentally, Jeffreys (2008; 2014a) argues that 
experiences of regret and reversion undercut both the diagnosis of gender dysphoria and the 
very process of transitioning itself. She approvingly quotes an opponent of the Bill, Baroness 
O’Cathain, who highlighted the case of Alan Finch as an example of the problems of 
diagnosing gender dysphoria and offering SRS (Jeffreys 2008, 335). Alan Finch is an 
Australian MtF transsexual who underwent SRS but later returned to living as male. He then 
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set up a website and pressure group, which campaigned against SRS and hormone treatment.x 
Finch represents a growing movement against the use of SRS and other processes that enable 
gender transitions.xi Jeffreys rejects a trans individual’s right to undergo state-supported 
surgery, arguing that there ‘is nothing flexible about carving “gender” on to the body with 
surgery and hormone treatments, as those who regret their “choices” discover’ (Jeffreys 2008, 
341). More recently she has referred to SRS as a ‘mutilating practice’ (Jeffreys 2014a, 70).xii 
 
One can certainly agree with Jeffreys that we should strive to strive to avoid cases of post-
transition regret.xiii Indeed, there is much research by clinicians into how levels of regret and 
reversion with regard to SRS can be minimised and ideally eliminated (e.g. Landén et al. 
1998; Lawrence 2003; Olsson and Möller 2006; Smith et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2005).xiv 
However, the available empirical evidence shows that instances of regret and reversion 
amongst individuals who undergo SRS are extremely low (Pearce 2014). In one study 
involving 232 participants, no one reported consistent regret following SRS and 15 
participants (6%) were sometimes regretful (Lawrence 2003). Only 2 participants (1%) had 
reverted to their prior sex/gender. More than 96% of participants gave a positive rating to 
their overall happiness with SRS and 97% reported that SRS had improved their quality of 
life. Similarly, Landén et al. (1998) found that 8 out of 213 participants (3.8%) in their study 
applied for reversal following SRS. Finally, Smith et al. (2005) report that out of 162 
participants 98.4% expressed no regrets about SRS, 91.6% were satisfied or very satisfied 
with the results of SRS and 8.4% were neutral. Such research leads Whittle and Turner (2007, 
3.15) to conclude that there is ‘strong evidence that the quality of life and mental health is 
much improved for a significant majority of trans people [after] reassignment’. 
 
On the issue of regret and reversion, Jeffreys is right to challenge the GRA’s stipulation of 
permanency; it should be possible for those who apply to the GRA to later change their 
sex/gender identity. We should also be concerned about those who experience regret or 
negative results from SRS, no matter how small the numbers. However, this does not mean 
that we should eradiate the GRA and ban SRS. To do so would be to deny people options that 
often have a positive impact their lives. As one individual said of the GRA: ‘I do think it’s 
improved the quality of my life to a level that I could never have thought possible’ (quoted in 
Hines 2013, 23). The availability of SRS and the GRA is particularly important given the 
severe social difficulties encountered by trans individuals, as both options can make a 
significant contribution to trans individuals’ well-being. Furthermore, if one only discusses 
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instances of regret and reversion, as Jeffreys does, then one is in danger of offering an 
unrepresentative and one-sided account of trans experiences. This prevents an accurate and 
productive discussion of the relative merits or demerits of the GRA and SRS. In the light of 
this, Pearce (2014) has warned of the harmful effects that discussions of trans regret, 
especially as this is portrayed in the media, can have on trans individuals.  
 
Finally, occurrences of regret do not mean that we should prevent people from 
transitioning. It might well be a condition of respecting people’s autonomy – including 
their capacity to determine what happens to their bodies – that we allow them to 
undertake actions that they may later regret, especially if they do not expect that they 
will regret them. At the very least, we would need to provide arguments, which anti-
SRS campaigners are yet to provide, as to why we can override someone’s autonomy in 
order to prevent them transitioning via the GRA or SRS. This is especially the case if we 
think that individuals have a prima facie right to bodily self-determination (Feinberg 
1998; Currah et al. 2006), something that many feminists have long asserted. 
 
 
Trans Identities, Gender and Patriarchy 
 
The criticisms that Jeffreys aims at the GRA fail to hit their mark; she provides no good 
reason to see it as inherently flawed. However, Jeffreys also claims that the GRA and trans 
identities are inimical to the goals and central tenets of feminism. This is because trans 
identities are dependent upon the concept of gender for their legibility, and radical feminist 
politics is aimed precisely at the elimination of gender itself. She thus draws a sharp line 
between, on the one hand, trans, queer and post-structural feminism, and, on the other hand, 
radical feminism: 
 
[W]here a radical feminist approach to transgenderism parts company with the 
post-modern/queer analysis is in seeing the problem with gender residing not just 
in the fact that gender is too rigidly policed and should be more flexible, or even 
played with, but in the concept of gender itself. Radical feminist theory rejects the 
notion of transgenderism since it requires the acceptance of ‘gender’ as a useful 
category. If the notion of ‘gender’ is rejected then transgenderism does not make 
sense. (Jeffreys 2008, 338) 
11 
 
 
The difference between these approaches hinges in large part on how “gender” is understood 
within them. Radical feminists tend to define gender as ‘a social hierarchy (masculine and 
feminine), ringed with stereotype, enforced by socialization [as well as physical force] to 
subordinate’ (MacKinnon, quoted in Jeffreys 2008, 339). On this view ‘masculinity is the 
behaviour and status of the ruling class of men and femininity is the status of the subordinate 
class of women. It would not make sense, therefore, to preserve [gender]’ (Jeffreys 2008, 
339-40). This brings to light the essential problem with the GRA for Jeffreys: once we see the 
task of feminism as eliminating gender, then the GRA – insofar as it is based upon, and thus 
sustains, the concept of gender as meaningful and valuable – is rendered as unconducive to 
this goal. 
 
How one should understand gender is a contentious, on-going debate within feminism, which 
cannot be answered decisively here. However, it is possible to challenge Jeffreys’s definition 
of gender as pertaining solely to patriarchal behaviours and social roles for being overly 
limited and reductive, and for producing a problematic politic. Specifically, Jeffreys ignores 
the complex and varied ways in which individuals reflectively and critically take up gender as 
a set of embodied experiences, values and dispositions. From the perspective of embodied 
reality, gender appears as a set of sexual, psychological, physical and social dimensions of 
selfhood that help to structure our ability to make sense of and affirm ourselves. Eradicating 
gender – if such a thing a thing were possible – would thus remove a central crux through 
which we construct a relation-to-self.  
 
This observation challenges Jeffreys’s (2008, 338) claim that gender is not a useful category. 
It is hard to discern how and why we should eradicate gender from our lives when it is so 
deeply embedded in our individual and collective sense of selves. Indeed, Mikkola (2011) has 
argued that positions such as Jeffreys are normatively unappealing for two reasons. First, 
because many people do not distinguish between sex and gender in their everyday 
experience, and hence will find it difficult to understand or relate to a politic that seeks to 
eliminate one but not the other; second, we often experience our gender as a positive source 
of value, and will thus be resistant to removing something that enhances our sense of self. 
Furthermore, focusing on gender as a social structure can overlook aspects of oppression and 
inequality that are only revealed by an analysis of embodied subjectivity (McNay 2014). Part 
of the promise of trans theory is its ability to reveal power dynamics embedded in gender 
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discourses and practices through its attention to the embodied experiences of trans 
individuals. 
 
As noted above, there are good reasons to challenge the assertion that “sex” and “gender” can 
and should be sharply distinguished, which is a foundational aspect Jeffreys’s radical feminist 
politics. Moi (1999, 4-5) argues that the movement to eliminate gender produces an 
impoverished theory of subjectivity because it fails to offer ‘a concrete, historical 
understanding of what it means to be women (or a man) in a given society’; it overlooks the 
embodied aspects of existence wherein one’s sex and gender are experienced as inseparable 
aspects of embodied selfhood. This is reflected in the self-narratives of many trans 
individuals (e.g Nagoshi et al. 2012; Rubin 2003; Shrock 2005), for whom the self could not 
be understood without the notion of embodied gender. Once we see sex and gender as 
inextricably intertwined, it is hard to make sense of a feminist politics that seeks to eradicate 
one whilst retaining the other.  
 
Jeffreys’s position leads her to claim that we should “reject” trans identities, meaning that she 
denies the viability and/or acceptability of trans identities. This fits with the position of Janice 
Raymond, cited by Jeffreys (2014a, xiii) as a major influence on her work, who argues that 
‘the problem of transsexualism would best be served by morally mandating it out of 
existence’ (Raymond 1994, 178). Radical feminist scepticism of trans identities springs from 
the belief that gender is simply an expression of patriarchal values about masculinity and 
femininity. Trans identities, which rely on gender in order to be meaningful, are therefore 
reliant upon and reproduce patriarchy. They are deemed to be essentially conservative and 
problematic insofar as they maintain and reproduce stereotypical, patriarchal conceptions of 
femininity and masculinity (Bindel 2004; Jeffreys 2005; Raymond 1994). As Burchill (2001) 
describes transsexuals: ‘they are woefully conventional souls... It is the literal-mindedness, 
the clunky logic of transsexuals that is so appalling (that, and their taste in blouses)… They 
are frilly, docile smilers who always wear make-up and never the trousers’. From this radical 
feminist perspective, the GRA is problematic because it supports the existence of trans 
identities by granting them legal recognition, which in turn reinforces patriarchy and the 
oppression of (“real”) women. 
 
Attention to the beliefs of trans individuals belies the radical feminist assertion that they are 
necessarily supportive of conservative, patriarchal gender norms. Trans individuals often 
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reflect critically on the problems with gender norms and the ways that they can reinforce 
conventional conceptions of men and women (e.g. Cromwell 1999; Davy 2011; Hines 2007; 
Namaste 2011; Monro 2005). As Rubin (2003, 2) notes, ‘One of the biggest 
misunderstandings of FTM transsexual lives is that they conform to traditional notions of 
gender’. The assertion that transsexuals uncritically endorse patriarchal stereotypes of gender 
is unjustified and promulgates an unhelpful distortion of trans identities. It is important to 
counter this claim because it has gained traction through being voiced by a number of trans 
critics (Bindel 2004; Hausman 1995; Jeffreys 2003; Raymond 1994). As Burchill (2001) 
writes of transsexuals: their ‘idea of womanhood seems to have survived intact from 1953. 
Despite their sticky lipstick rictuses, they are the ultimate example of a particularly middle-
class, middle-aged male arrogance’ (which also implies that all transsexuals are MtF). In 
addition to lacking empirical support, this criticism strips trans individuals of critical self-
reflection and agency (Davy 2011; Heyes 2003). It substitutes the real life experiences and 
beliefs of trans individuals, especially their complexity and diversity, for homogeneous, 
stereotyped and ungrounded representations. 
 
Furthermore, not all medical practitioners are either consciously or unconsciously acting as a 
conduit for patriarchal values. Many distance themselves from such values and some utilise 
feminist frameworks to help them work with trans individuals (e.g. May 2002). The medical 
community is not the monolithic expression of patriarchal domination that Jeffreys – and 
other critics of trans identities, such as Hausman (1995) and Raymond (1994) – assert that it 
is. In terms of the GRA, Jeffreys (2008, 332) argues that it reinforces problematic gender 
stereotypes because members of the GRA panel are likely to invoke their assumptions about 
what men and women should be like. There is certainly reason to be concerned if the 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria and the GRA panel are guided by conventional conceptions of 
“proper” masculine and feminine identities, which can cause some individuals to be denied 
recognition because they fail to meet these normative expectations. However, Whittle and 
Turner (2007, 6.11) report that, as of January 2007, 1704 people had been awarded a gender 
recognition certificate whereas only 40 applications had been rejected, and most of these 
were ex-patriots who were unable to provide the requisite medical evidence.  
 
This suggests that the GRA panel is not applying a narrowly stereotypical conception of what 
a man or a woman is like.xv It should also be noted that Stephen Whittle, a leading trans 
activist and gender theorist, was invited to sit in on sessions of the GRA panel in order to 
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assess them. Whilst the medical community has historically enforced a heavily normalised 
conception of masculine and feminine identity, the situation is changing as practitioners 
become more aware of trans issues. Problems certainly do persist with how trans individuals 
are understood and treated by practitioners (Whittle et al. 2007; Whittle et al. 2008) and a 
number of trans individuals report negative experiences with the medical community (Davy 
2011; Hines 2013). However, this suggests the need for better education on trans issues 
within the medical community, rather than abolishing the GRA and preventing individuals 
from transitioning. 
 
 
Feminism and the Future of the GRA 
 
In the two previous sections I responded to Jeffreys’s critique – and the radical feminist 
perspective more broadly – of both the GRA and trans identities. I defended the way in which 
sex and gender are conceptualised within the GRA, countered concerns about the occurrence 
of regret and argued that neither the GRA nor trans identities are inherently supportive of 
patriarchy. This should allay the fears that some feminists harbour about trans identities and 
provide a counterbalance to unwarranted stereotypes of trans individuals. It also challenges 
Jeffreys’s (2008, 342) conclusion that the GRA ‘inscribes patriarchal notions of correct 
gender roles into law and regulations by the state’. Consequently, I suggest that feminists 
have little reason to see trans theory and trans individuals as a threat to their political 
aspirations. Indeed, there are growing transfeminist movements that seek to build coalitions 
between trans and cis theorists and activists whilst sharing the radical feminist aims of 
combating patriarchy and liberating women (e.g. Enke 2012; Koyama 2003). As Elliot (2010, 
28) notes, ‘many trans people identify with feminism or seek allies in the feminist 
community’. 
 
Nevertheless, this may not satisfy feminists committed to the belief that only biological 
women can ever be considered women. This position incorporates feminists who do not 
explicitly criticise trans identities such as Braidotti (1994, 187) and Grosz (1994, 207), who 
suggests that ‘Men, contrary to the fantasy of the transsexual, can never, even with surgical 
intervention, feel or experience what it is like to be, to live, as women’. Within this 
ontological perspective Heyes (2003, 1108) has suggested that the ‘hypothesis that 
transgender is antifeminist seems unfalsifiable, and one is left wondering if there could be 
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any kind of trans life that would satisfy Raymond [and other radical feminists] with its 
feminist credentials and contribution to social transformation’ (cf. Riddell 2006, 150). If we 
cannot overcome this theoretical stand-off, then we can at least tackle trans critics on 
important matters of detail. Thus, I have shown that many of the assertions that radical 
feminists make about trans individuals are unsubstantiated. Furthermore, I have argued that a 
feminist politics that seeks to eradicate gender overlooks the ways in which it is lived at the 
level of embodiment. This leads radical feminist critics of trans identities to disregard the 
frequent distress that accompanies gender dysphoria and hence to ignore a major reason why 
the GRA is to be welcomed. 
 
The inattention to the difficulties encountered by trans individuals demonstrated on the part 
of Jeffreys and other radical feminists may represent an example of what Serano (2007) 
labels “cissexualism”. This term denotes the privileging of individuals whose biological sex 
and sense of gender identity align. Insofar as cis identities are taken as normative, trans 
identities can only appear as deviant and abnormal, which both compounds and legitimates 
the social difficulties that they encounter. This is reflected in the fact that cis individuals are 
rarely required to prove or justify their identity, whilst trans individuals are continually 
subject to authenticating practices.xvi Countering cissexualism involves self-reflection on 
one’s own positioning within a socially-constructed, exclusionary sex/gender system as well 
as attending to the issues encountered by people who fall outside of the normative boundaries 
of sex/gender identity.xvii 
 
Trans individuals frequently encounter social stigma, exclusion and both verbal and physical 
violence owing to their identities (Gordon and Meyer 2008; Lombardi et al. 2001; Stotzer 
2009; Whittle et al. 2007). In one study (Whittle et al. 2007) 73% of respondents experienced 
harassment, 47% did not use public or leisure facilities for fear of discriminatory treatment 
and 45% experienced family breakdowns. The researchers conclude that trans people 
‘experience high levels of inequalities and discrimination in all walks and aspects of life’ 
(Whittle et al. 2007, 9). This often has a severe negative impact upon the lives of trans 
individuals, as evidenced by the prevalence of suicide attempts by members of the trans 
population (Moody and Smith 2013; Haas et al. 2011), with studies reporting a figure of 41% 
(Haas et al. 2014), 29.9% (Whittle et al. 2008) and 34.4% (Whittle et al. 2007). This 
compares, for example, to the 0.6% of the non-trans population in the U.S. that has attempted 
suicide.xviii The NHS meanwhile states that there at least 140,000 suicide attempts in England 
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and Wales each year (NHS 2012), which represents just 0.24% of the population.xix Liu and 
Mustanksi (2012) have reported on the high levels of suicidal ideation and self-harm amongst 
trans youth, whilst Whittle et al. (2007) note that trans individuals are overrepresented in the 
prison population. 
 
Given these figures, legislation that helps to validate the identities and experiences of trans 
individuals by recognising the legitimacy of their claims is valuable, even if it is not perfect. 
As one transsexual stated, 
 
Transsexuals have gone from being socially unacceptable to being sanctioned by 
government. And that makes a big difference for many people. Whereas they 
thought that I was some sort of crazy, now Parliament is saying I’m perfectly all 
right, and there are many other people like me, and that’s a good thing (quoted in 
Hines 2013, 22-3). 
 
This quote highlights the symbolic value of the GRA; in addition to the practical benefits it 
offers, it can help to further the social acceptance of trans identities by recognising the 
legitimacy of their claims and experiences. Hines (2013, 66) observes that ‘Research findings 
indicate that the GRA has had positive impacts for many participants in terms of the practical 
benefits it has brought… For some participants, the GRA also brought increased esteem 
through the legitimation of their identity’. 
 
This does not mean that the GRA is without problems and there is certainly room for 
improvement moving forward. In particular, Hines (2007), Davy (2011) and Sandland (2005) 
highlight the fact that the GRA remains wedded to a binary notion of gender, which can work 
to exclude some trans identities – for example, intersex, bi-gendered and androgynous 
identities – from legal recognition on the grounds that the GRA only accommodates 
individuals who identify as unambiguously “male” or “female”. We should thus consider 
ways in which the GRA, and society in general, can better respond to and accommodate the 
plethora of transgender identities that sit outside the gender binary (Hines 2013; Monro 
2005). Furthermore, the stipulation that one intends to spend the rest of one’s life in one’s 
chosen sex/gender category appears problematic when placed alongside a model of the self as 
fluid because the GRA implies stability and predictability of the self that often eludes us. 
Thus, it would be appropriate to remove this requirement of the GRA. 
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Finally, a number of trans theorists, activists and individuals have argued against the GRA’s 
reliance upon medical practitioners, who are necessary for the diagnosis of gender dysphoria 
(see, e.g., Davy 2011; Hines 2013). On this last point, it is instructive to consider the recent 
GRA passed in Denmark, which only requires that (i) individuals affirm their desire to 
change sex/gender; and (ii) reaffirm this desire six months later. Providing that these two 
conditions are met, individuals will be able to change their legal sex/gender status. This 
marks a complete break from the medicalised dimension of trans identities by removing the 
requirement that the applicant be diagnosed with gender dysphoria. However, one reason that 
the complete de-medicalisation of trans identities is controversial is that state funding for 
hormone treatment, SRS and other medical practices (e.g. counselling) will be harder to 
obtain if they are not seen as medically necessitated, which is something that the diagnosis of 
gender dysphoria secures. 
 
What is clear is that debates about the GRA, and trans identities in general, are complex and 
far from settled. They continue to be of relevance as governments introduce GRAs, as the 
Republic of Ireland is doing this year, and as trans theory challenges and enriches feminist 
theory and practice. As noted at the outset, the GRA also raises important ethical and political 
questions, such as the use of public gendered spaces by trans individuals. This is because the 
GRA challenges the established notion that biological sex supervenes onto social gender, 
such that only those born, say, female, can ever be properly considered female. There is 
important work to be done in thinking through the increasing ways in which settled concepts 
of sex and gender are being shaken by trans identities, which requires that feminists of every 
ilk engage with trans theory and activism.  
 
However, that the GRA gives rise to complex, contentious issues is not reason to reject it. 
Rather, we should seek to foster constructive dialogue within and across trans and cis 
communities, as well as within the academic community, in order to understand and 
accommodate individuals who feel an often irresistible need to change their sex/gender. To 
reject trans identities, as many radical feminists do, is to disregard the social suffering of a 
number of individuals and also to foreclose the possibility for exploring new ways of 
inhabiting sex/gender identities. This suggests the necessity of a feminism that can embrace a 
plurality of sex/gender identities and practices, with a focus on working through rather than 
ostracising difference. Within such a (trans)feminist perspective the GRA forms part of a 
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wider movement to accept, rather than eradicate, diversity and to respect the embodied 
realities of all individuals, trans or otherwise. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The relationship between radical feminists and trans individuals is an often fraught one. 
Radical feminists accuse trans individuals of reinforcing gender stereotypes and hindering 
efforts to eradicate gender, going so far as to argue that trans identities do not make sense and 
should be eliminated. The GRA is criticised for supporting trans identities and reinforcing 
gender, which contributes to the continued oppression of women. In this paper I have sought 
to alleviate the concerns of radical feminists by responding to criticisms of both the GRA and 
trans identities. Focusing on Jeffreys’s work as representative of this critique, I have argued 
that her concerns about the way in which sex and gender are understood within the GRA, as 
well as her worries about transsexual regret and reversion, are unfounded. Furthermore, I 
demonstrated that the GRA does not necessarily reinforce patriarchal stereotypes of men and 
women. Consequently, I challenged Jeffreys’s assertion that it is a regressive piece of 
legislation. Instead, I revealed the important practical and symbolic benefits it can bring to 
the lives of some trans individuals.  
 
Having defended the GRA against Jeffreys’s critique, I then turned to the wider radical 
feminist rejection of trans identities. Challenging the radical feminist goal of eliminating 
gender, I argued that gender is an important component within an effective feminist politics 
and that the aim of eradicating gender is both conceptually problematic and normatively 
unappealing. In particular, I stressed the importance of attending to experiences of gender 
embodiment as both a source of positive self-understanding and as a means to identify and 
respond to instances of oppression. I then turned to the claim that trans individuals are 
“dupes” of a patriarchal gender system, which is a criticism frequently voiced by radical 
feminists. Attending to the beliefs and experiences of trans individuals belies this concern, for 
they are often highly critical of gender norms and the medical system that enforces them.  
 
On the basis of this analysis, I concluded that there is little reason to see the goals and 
concerns of feminism and trans theory as necessarily incompatible. Indeed, as noted, there is 
a growing transfeminist movement that seeks productive collaboration and shared 
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understanding between trans theorists and feminists of every ilk. One major task for an 
effective transfeminism is to explore how best to accommodate the plethora of sex/gender 
identities that currently exist within society and to respond to the pervasive violence and 
exclusion that many trans individuals experience. Part of this task will involve informed, 
productive discussion of the GRA, an acknowledgement of its merits, and an analysis of how 
it might be improved. It is hoped that this paper has made a valuable contribution to such a 
discussion as well as attempts to generate an inclusive, transfeminist movement.  
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“gender” a purely social one.  
ii This is not to imply that “trans theory” and “feminism” represent two unified, homogeneous camps. There are 
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about trangender people and issues. Available online at: http://publicreligion.org/research/2011/11/american-
attitudes-towards-transgender-people/#.VfqPn5coef4.  
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for a glossary of these terms).  
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normative position; it gives a name to something that is otherwise taken for granted and hence not considered 
necessary to name. In so doing, it challenges the tendency to only name that which is different and/or deviant. 
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xi See the website Sex Change Regret (http://www.sexchangeregret.com), Bindel (2009) and Jeffreys (2014a). 
xii If Jeffreys’s argument that occurrences of regret and reversion undermine the justification for SRS is 
persuasive, then it could well be read as supporting, rather than challenging, the GRA. This is because the GRA 
does not require that applicants undergo SRS, which means that it sidesteps any potential problems associated 
with SRS. 
xiii However, owing to the nature of identity it might not be possible to prevent all cases of regret. Furthermore, 
experiences of regret need not be seen as necessarily problematic. 
xiv We should, however, be cautious about how the concept of “regret” is understood within such studies 
(McQueen 2015b). 
xv Unless the only applicants are individuals who exhibit thoroughly conventional sex/gender identities, which is 
possible although unlikely given the diversity of the trans population.  
xvi For an extensive list of examples of cis-privilege, see http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2011/11/list-of-
cisgender-privileges/ 
xvii See St. James (2015) for a good response to the controversies that the ideas of cissexualism and cis privilege 
have generated. 
xviii http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf. 
xix This figure appears to be based on the assumption that each suicide attempt is by a different person, which 
may be unjustified. 
